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The National Hockey League's Faceoff
with Antitrust: McCourt v. California Sports, Inc.
If the everyday sports fan were asked to describe the most outstanding
characteristic of a professional athlete, he might reply "overpaid." Indeed,
the business of professional sport has expanded tremendously in the past
twenty years, and multimillion dollar contracts are becoming more the rule,
rather than the exception. Yet, while the layman's view of the professional
athlete may be correct, it is only partly so. Those who are somewhat better
versed in the area have recognized that while the professional athlete may be
overpaid, he is subject to a system that some have compared to slavery.
During the 1971 Senate hearings on a bill to authorize the merger of the
American and National Basketball Associations, then Senator Sam Ervin of
North Carolina commented:
Many years ago, the term 'chattel' was used to denote the legal status of slaves.
That is, they were considered a type of chattel which was owned as a piece of
furniture or livestock was owned. This use of the term 'chattel' applied to human
beings and the condition it stands for are so abhorrent that we don't even like to
acknowledge that they ever existed. Yet, in a real sense that is what these hearings
are about today-modem peonage and the giant sports trusts.I
Like slaves, professional athletes are traded sometimes by request and
sometimes, as in the case of Dale McCourt, against their will. Such practices
would be unheard of in most other industries, but it is demanded by the
unique nature of professional sports. The success and power of a professional
team, and the league of which it is a part, depend upon competition. Competi-
tion means fan interest, and fan interest means success. This is why profes-
sional teams have attempted to bind players to them by imposing what are
commonly called equalization provisions.2 While the era of free agency3 has
impeded the power of a professional team to bind any particular athlete to it,
the robbing Peter to pay Paul idea behind equalization provisions has allowed
the teams to hold on to some of their competitive edge by requiring compensa-
tion in the form of money or man from the competitor that has lured their
athlete(s) away.
1. Hearings on S. 2373 before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Sen. Comm. on Judiciary,
92d Cong., Ist Sess. 12 (1971).
2. Equalization provisions are part of overall schemes called reserve systems that are designed to protect
teams from loss of players. National Hockey League By-Law 9A 6 provides:
Each time that a player becomes a free agent and the right to his services is subsequently acquired by
any Member Club other than the club with which he was last under contract or by any club owned or
controlled by any such Member Club, the Member Club first acquiring the right to his services, or
owning or controlling the club first acquiring that right, shall make an equalization payment to the
Member Club with which such player was previously under contract ....
600 F.2d 1193, 1203-09 (6th Cir. 1979).
3. Paragraph 17 (c) of the National Hockey League Standard Players Contract allows a player to sign a
Players Option Contract, which is to last for one season. At the conclusion of that contract the player becomes a
free agent and has the right to negotiate with any club in the league or with any other club. 600 F.2d 1193, 1194
n.2 (6th Cir. 1979).
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Perhaps, at least in part, it was the feeling of slavery that prompted
professional athletes to organize and form unions during the 1960s. They
hoped unionization would help them obtain a better bargaining position with
team owners and would lead to the removal of restrictive league by-laws that
were incorporated into their contracts.*
Indeed, the federal labor laws express a preference for the collective
bargaining process 5 and its resulting agreements. There is, on the other hand,
a strong federal policy favoring a competitive system and the efficiencies it
creates. The promotion of economic efficiencies is the goal of antitrust.
When, through the collective bargaining process, union and employer arrive
at agreements that restrain competition and are otherwise violative of the
antitrust laws, the courts are put in the precarious position of deciding
whether the values seen in collective bargaining outweigh those of antitrust,
thus entitling such collectively bargained agreements to an exemption from
the antitrust laws.
The unionization of professional athletes has drawn professional sports
into this arena of conflict between the federal antitrust and labor laws, a
conflict that has resulted in the utilization of the athletes' union bargaining
tool against an athlete in the case of McCourt v. California Sports, Inc.6
McCourt (a player) challenged the validity of the National Hockey League's
(NHL) equalization provision, By-Law 9A, under the antitrust laws. His
challenge failed because, according to the court, the equalization provision
was arrived at through bona fide arm's length collective bargaining, which
entitled it to a nonstatutory labor exemption from the antitrust laws.
This Case Comment will briefly review the development of the labor
exemption from the antitrust laws and its application in similar suits challeng-
ing similar equalization provisions in professional baseball, football and
hockey. A brief look at the reasons for and against equalization provisions
will reveal both why they are probably violative of the antitrust laws and why
we should not do away with them. The McCourt dissent raises some interest-
ing questions and offers some convincing arguments. This Case Comment
answers these questions and refutes these arguments, concluding that the
majority in McCourt probably reached the correct result.
4. The equalization provision contained in By-Law 9A, which was incorporated into Paragraph 18 of the
Standard Players Contract signed by McCourt, provided in part: "[Plarties mutually promise and agree to be
legally bound by the Constitution and By-Laws of the League and by all terms and provisions thereof." 600 F.2d
1193, 1195 n.2 (6th Cir. 1979).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976), provides in part:
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain
collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of
commerce by removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging
practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to
wages, hours, and other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power between
employers and employees ....
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial
obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they
have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining ....
(emphasis added).
6. 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979).
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LABOR EXEMPTION FROM THE
ANTITRUST LAWS
A. The Statutory Exemption
The purpose of the Sherman Act7 is to protect consumers against rising
prices and limitations on production and to prevent the deterioration of
product quality, a purpose which the Act attempts to achieve by forcing
businessmen to compete with one another.8 Section 1 of the Act prohibits
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade. 9 Section 2 proscribes
monopolies.'0 Some feared that the Act would be applicable to unions whose
activities (strikes, boycotts, and the like) clearly "monopolized" the labor
market." The fear was born out of the Danberry Hatters case, ' 2 in which the
Supreme Court held that the union's secondary activity of urging a consumer
boycott against the struck hat manufacturer was an unlawful restraint of trade
and a violation of the Sherman Act. Still, unions were an essential element in
the laborers' quest to deal in equality with their employers 3 and, in hopes of
remedying any doubt about a union's ability to function under the antitrust
laws, Congress passed the Clayton Act. 14 Section 6 of the Act made it clear
that the labor of a human being was not a commodity or article of commerce
and that nothing in the antitrust laws could forbid the existence of labor
unions. Section 20 of the Clayton Act limited the courts' ability to interfere in
union-employer disputes concerning terms and conditions of employment
unless it was necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property."
The seemingly broad scope of the Clayton Act was narrowed by the
Supreme Court holding in Duplex Printing Press Company v. Deering. '6 The
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
8. Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 252, 256 (1955).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1980): "'Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal ......
10. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1980): 'Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States ... shall be deemed guilty of a felony ... 
Ii. See note 8 supra.
12. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
13. American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209 (1921).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1980) in relevant part states:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the
antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor... organiza-
tions ... or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out
the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations... be held or construed to be illegal
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976), in relevant part states:
No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the United States.... in any
case... growing out of, a dispute concerning terms and conditions of employment, unless necessary
to prevent irreparable injury to property... for which injury there is no adequate remedy at law ....
And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any person or persons.., from termi-
nating any relation of employment, or from ceasing to perform any work or labor, or from recommend-
ing, advising, or persuading others by peaceful means to do so;... or from peacefully persuading any
person to work or abstain from working;... nor shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be
considered or held to be violations of any law of the United States.
16. 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
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International Association of Machinists had combined with its local affiliate to
interfere with and restrain the manufacturer's trade by means of a secondary
boycott. With the asserted goal of unionizing the manufacturer's factory, the
union exerted pressures on the customers of the printing press company not
to buy, transport, install, or repair the company's printing presses. The com-
pany sought Sherman Act relief, while the union claimed that sections 6 and
20 of the Clayton Act exempted its activities from antitrust sanctions. The
Court held the statutory exemption of the Clayton Act inapplicable, stating:
"there is nothing in [section 6 of the Clayton Act] to exempt such an organiza-
tion [a union] or its members from accountability where it or they depart from
its normal and legitimate objects and engage in an actual combination or
conspiracy in restraint of trade." 7 The Court went on to hold that section 20
of the Clayton Act was operative only in disputes between employers and
their immediate employees, 8 rendering the union weapon of secondary boy-
cotts still subject to the Sherman Act.' 9
During the 1930s, Congress passed legislation designed to curtail the role
of the courts in the formation of labor policy. The Norris-LaGuardia Act,20
enacted in 1932, limited the power of federal courts to issue injunctions in
labor disputes by enumerating specific acts that were not subject to restrain-
ing orders or injunctions, as well as expanding the Supreme Court's Duplex
definition of what constituted a labor dispute.2' The Wagner Act of 193522
expressed the federal policy favoring union organization and collective
bargaining. None of the labor laws, however, made any reference to what sort
of union activities would violate the Sherman Act. In Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader,23 the Court attempted to strike a balance between the freedom to
organize granted to unions by the federal labor laws, and the proscriptions on
those efforts by the antitrust laws. The Court refused to grant Sherman Act
relief to a hosiery manufacturer victimized by a violent sitdown strike, even
though the union had engaged in activity that prevented the shipment of goods
to out-of-state customers. The Court felt that the Sherman Act would not
17. Id. at 469.
18. Id. at 472-74.
19. See Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 659,665
(1965).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976), provides in relevant part:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or... injunction in
any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating
or interested in such dispute ... from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work ... ;
(b) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization ....
29 U.S.C. § 113 (c), provides:
The term "'labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms and conditions of employment,
or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing,
or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
22. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1976). See note 5 supra.
23. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
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apply to strikes or other obstructions to interstate commerce unless they had
an effect or were intended to have an effect on prices.24 Since the union's
purpose in Apex was to organize and no effect on prices had been shown, the
Court refused to grant the manufacturer antitrust relief. The Court did hold,
however, that the Sherman Act would have been applicable to the union's
activity if the strike had affected commercial competition, 25 illustrating that
while the unions had obtained greater freedom from Sherman Act scrutiny for
certain activities, no clear exemption was as yet available to them.
The Court did carve out a labor exemption from the antitrust laws in
United States v. Hutcheson.26 A lengthy dispute between carpenters and
machinists over the installation of machinery at a new brewery culminated in
a strike by the carpenters at the site of the brewery. In addition to the strike,
the carpenters picketed the brewery and sent out union publications request-
ing that union members and their friends refrain from buying Anheuser-Busch
beer. 27 The union was charged with violating section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The Court, by reading the Norris-LaGuardia Act in conjunction with section
20 of the Clayton Act, held that the Sherman Act was inapplicable to the
practices specifically enumerated in section 20.28 Thus the section 20 practices
of peaceful strikes and boycotts were statutorily excluded from the Sherman
Act, at least if they occurred in the course of a labor dispute.29 The breadth
of labor's statutory exemption was solidified in Hutcheson by Justice
Frankfurter's oft-quoted passage:
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-labor
groups, the licit and the illicit under § 20 are not to be distinguished by any
judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the
selfishness or unselfishness of the end of which the particular union activities are
the means.30
Reading Apex and Hutcheson together, it can be said that union restraints
on the labor market are statutorily exempt from the Sherman Act if the
restraints are the result of activities condoned by the Norris-LaGuardia Act
and 'section 20 of the Clayton Act. On the other hand, Hutcheson indicated
that labor's statutory exemption from the Sherman Act would be lost once the
union combined with employer groups in conspiracies to obtain restrictions
on the product market.
The court faced the issue of employer-union combinations in Allen
Bradley Co. v. Local 3, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.3,
24. Id. at 501. See also Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. CHI.
L. REV. 659, 666 (1965).
25. 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940).
26. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
27. Id. at 228.
28. Id. at 230.
29. See Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 659,668,
(1965).
30. 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941).
31. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
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The union, which had jurisdiction over the metropolitan area of New York
City, sought to obtain more work for its members. It realized that local manu-
facturers-employers of the local members-must have the widest possible
outlets for their products in order to increase demand, which in turn would
increase work for union members. The union waged an aggressive campaign
to obtain closed-shop agreements with all electrical equipment manufacturers
and contractors. Under the closed-shop agreements, contractors were obli-
gated to purchase equipment only from local manufacturers who also had
closed-shop agreements with the union, and the manufacturers obligated
themselves to confine their New York City sales to contractors who em-
ployed the Local's members. Free from outside competition, the local manu-
facturers raised their prices. Wages went up and worker's hours were short-
ened. Allen Bradley and other electrical equipment manufacturers located
outside of New York City were prevented from selling their products in the
city because of the closed-shop agreements. To overcome that obstacle, the
outside manufacturers filed suit against the union claiming it had violated
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The Court found the union guilty of
Sherman Act violations and expressed the opinion that congressional intent
was not to allow unions and nonlabor groups to combine to create business
monopolies that would control the marketing of goods and services. The
Court emphatically proscribed such activities, stating:
So far as the union might have achieved [the result of individual refusals of all their
employers to buy electrical equipment not made by the union] acting alone, it
would have been the natural consequence of labor union activities exempted by
the Clayton Act from the coverage of the Sherman Act. But when the unions
participated with a combination of business men who had complete power to
eliminate all competition among themselves and to prevent all competition from
others, a situation was created not included within the exemptions of the Clayton
and Norris-LaGuardia Acts.32
Thus, unions would be guilty of Sherman Act violations when they aided
nonlabor groups in creating business monopolies.33
Apex, Hutcheson and Allen Bradley indicated that those union activities
enumerated in section 20 of the Clayton Act and the Norris LaGuardia Act
would be immune from the antitrust laws if the activity furthered the union's
own interests and was not a knowing part of a larger business combination
designed to increase price or regulate supply in the product market.
34
B. The Development of the Non-Statutory Labor Exemption
The Court had indicated in Allen Bradley that it would recognize certain
union activities to be exempt from the antitrust laws if those activities related
32. Id. at 809 (citation omitted).
33. Id. at 808.
34. See Comment, Connell: Broadening Labor's Antitrust Liability While Narrowing Its Construction
Industry Proviso Protection, 27 CATH. U. L. REV. 305, 311 (1978).
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to efforts to obtain better wages, hours, and working conditions for its mem-
bers and if the union acted alone. 35 The same union activities may or may not
be in violation of the Sherman Act depending on whether the union acted
alone or in combinations with business groups.36
The applicability of the labor exemption from the Sherman Act becomes
doubtful when it appears that anticompetitive repercussions on the product
market are the objective rather than merely the result of any particular collec-
tive bargaining agreement. 37 The Court considered this problem in the com-
panion cases of United Mine Workers v. Pennington38 and Local 189,
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.
39
In Pennington, the union had entered into a collective bargaining agree-
ment with several coal companies, large and small. A small operator alleged
that the union and certain large coal operators had conspired to restrain and
monopolize interstate commerce in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act. The purposes of this attempt were to eliminate the small non-
unionized operators from the industry, to limit production, and to preempt the
market for the large unionized operators. The Court held such activity to be a
violation of the antitrust laws. In a plurality opinion, Justice White said that a
union could conclude a wage agreement with a multi-employer bargaining unit
without violating the antitrust laws, 40 and that the federal labor laws
expressed a favoritism for collectively bargained agreements concerning
wages, hours, and other working conditions (mandatory subjects of bargain-
ing) 4 ' because they eliminated substantial obstructions to the free flow of
commerce. This policy, however, does not automatically exempt from
Sherman Act scrutiny an agreement resulting from union-employer negotia-
tions over compulsory subjects of bargaining.42 The union in Pennington for-
feited its exemption when it was shown that it had agreed with one set of
employers to impose a certain wage scale on other bargaining units.43 Justice
White went on to say:
One group of employers may not conspire to eliminate competitors from the
industry and the union is liable with the employers if it becomes a party to the
conspiracy. This is true even though the union's part in the scheme is an undertak-
35. 325 U.S. 797, 807 (1945).
36. A good example of the Allen Bradley doctrine is seen in Local 175, International Bhd. of Elec. Workers
v. United States, 219 F.2d 431 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 917 (1955). There it was held that a union could
not further the interests of its members by helping an employer group to gain monopoly power in a product
market through rigged bidding and noncompetitive allocation of contracts.
37. See Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 659,689
(1965).
38. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
39. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
40. 381 U.S. 657, 664 (1965).
41. See note 5 supra. Under § 8 (d) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (d) (1976),
mandatory subjects of bargaining in a collective bargaining agreement include "'wages," "hours," and
other "'terms and conditions of employment."
42. 381 U.S. 657, 665 (1965).
43. Id.
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ing to secure the same wages, hours or other conditions of employment from the
remaining employers in the industry."
Justices -Douglas, Black, and Clark agreed with White's conclusion, basing
their reasoning on Allen Bradley. They felt that
[if the] employers and the union agreed on a wage scale that exceeded the financial
ability of some operators to pay and that if it was made for the purpose of forcing
some employers out of business, the union as well as the employers who partici-
pated in the arrangement with the union should be found to have violated the
antitrust laws.
45
Jewel Tea concerned a union's effort to have a meat marketing hours
restriction placed in its collective bargaining agreement with several super-
market chains in the Chicago area. The union was concerned with the working
hours of its butchers since the supermarkets wanted to maintain self-serve
meat counters after 6 p.m. The restriction was inserted in the collective bar-
gaining agreement, notwithstanding the fact that the employers had asked for
a relaxation of the restriction. All the employers agreed to the restriction with
the exception of National Tea Co. and Jewel Tea Co. Jewel eventually signed
the agreement under the threat of a strike. Jewel then filed suit claiming the
restriction violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.46 Justice White felt
that the agreement was entitled to a nonstatutory exemption from the
Sherman Act. 47 He stated the issue to be
whether the marketing hours restriction, like wages, and unlike prices, is so inti-
mately related to wages, hours and working conditions that the unions' successful
attempt to obtain that provision through bona fide, arm's-length bargaining in
pursuit of their own labor policies, and not at the behest of or in combination with
nonlabor groups, falls within the protection of national labor policy and is there-
fore exempt from the Sherman Act.
48
White felt the agreement was entitled to a nonstatutory exemption from the
Sherman Act because the National Labor Relations Act had placed union-
employer agreements concerning when, as well as how long, employees must
work beyond antitrust scrutiny. 49 The fact that employers and unions are
required to bargain about wages, hours, and working conditions "weighs
heavily in favor of antitrust exemption for agreements on these subjects." 50
This agreement represented a valid union concern and was not a part of an
employer conspiracy to put restrictions on the product market. Justices
Goldberg, Harlan, and Stewart dissented in Pennington and agreed with the
44. Id. at 665-66.
45. Id. at 672-75 (Douglas, J., concurring).
46. 381 U.S. 676, 681 (1%5).
47. Id. at 688.
48. Id. at 689-90.
49. Id. at 691.
50. Id. at 689.
51. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
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decision in Jewel Tea.52 They felt that the Court should follow the
Hutcheson53 analysis, which recognized that labor's antitrust exemption was
derived from a synthesis of all pertinent labor legislation. 4 They believed
that, to effectuate congressional intent, collective bargaining agreements that
concerned mandatory subjects of bargaining under the Labor Act should not
be held subject to the antitrust laws. To tell employers and unions that they
must bargain over wages, hours, and working conditions but still may be
subject to the antitrust laws would, according to Goldberg, "stultify the
Congressional scheme.", 55 Justices Douglas, Black, and Clark dissented in
Jewel Tea, expressing the opinion that Allen Bradley foreclosed such an
expansive view of the labor exemption to the antitrust laws.56
The decisions in Jewel Tea and Pennington left the question of labor's
exemption from the Sherman Act somewhat unclear. In Pennington the Court
found bargaining about wages and working conditions (mandatory subjects of
bargaining) to be violative of the Sherman Act when it was used to drive other
competitors out of business. On the other hand, the Court in Jewel Tea upheld
a marketing hours restriction that put a direct restraint on the product market
of self-serve meat sales because the restriction was intimately related to a
legitimate union concern-working hours of butchers. Pennington and Jewel
Tea expressed the Court's belief that if a particular collective bargaining
agreement concerned the mandatory subjects of bargaining, wages, hours,
and working conditions, the evidence would weigh heavily in favor of granting
that collective bargaining agreement a limited nonstatutory exemption from
the Sherman Act even though its effect was to restrain the product market.
Justice White refused to go that far, feeling that the agreement, even though
concerning mandatory subjects of bargaining, had to reflect legitimate union
concerns and not be a mere employer-union combination to exclude competi-
tion. Indeed, three Justices felt that if the collective bargaining agreement
contained mandatory subjects of bargaining, the agreement was automatically
exempt from the Sherman Act.
57
In 1975 the Court again had the opportunity to determine the breadth of
labor's exemption from the Sherman Act in Connell Construction Co. v.
Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 100.58 The union had attempted to organize
mechanical subcontractors by staging pickets against several general contrac-
tors, including Connell. The union wanted to force the general contractors to
agree to deal only with subcontractors who were parties to the union's collec-
52. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
53. See text accompanying notes 26-30 supra.
54. In addition to §§ 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Justice Goldberg
referred to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 Stat. 1060, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1976), the
Walsh-Healey Act, 49 Stat. 2036, as amended, 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1976), and the Wagner Act with its
Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin amendments, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (d).
55. 381 U.S. 676, 711-12 (1965).
56. Id. at 735 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 689-93.
58. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
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tive bargaining agreement. The picketing succeeded and Connell signed an
agreement to deal only with unionized subcontractors. Connell then sought to
have the agreement rendered invalid as being violative of sections I and 2 of
the Sherman Act. The union claimed that the agreement made with Connell
was entitled to the nonstatutory exemption from the Sherman Act. The Court,
in an opinion by Justice Powell, held that the agreement between the union
and Connell was not entitled to a nonstatutory exemption from the Sherman
Act. In so doing, the Court appeared to retreat from Justice White's position
in Jewel Tea toward the position taken by Justice Goldberg in that case.
Justice Powell recognized that the source of the nonstatutory exemption
came from the strong labor policy favoring the association of employees to
eliminate competition over wage and working conditions. The union's ability
to organize workers and standardize wages would affect price competition
among employers, but the congressional goals expressed in the federal labor
laws could never be achieved if the effect on business competition were to be
considered a violation of the antitrust laws.5 9 Powell went on to state:
"[W]hile the statutory exemption allows unions to accomplish some restraints
by acting unilaterally .... the non-statutory exemption offers no similar
protection when a union and a nonlabor party agree to restrain competition in
a business market." 60 Powell felt that the union's goal of organizing the sub-
contractors was legal but its methods were not.6' The restraint on the business
market had substantial anticompetitive effects and "would not follow natur-
ally from the elimination of competition over wages and working conditions.
It contravene[d] antitrust policies to a degree not justified by congressional
labor policy, and therefore cannot claim a nonstatutory exemption from the
antitrust laws." 62
The union in Connell had no interest in unionizing employees of the
contractors. The agreement reached with Connell was, therefore, not made a
part of a collective bargaining agreement. If it had, according to Powell, the
agreement might have been entitled to a nonstatutory exemption.63 Powell
cited the opinion of Goldberg in Jewel Tea indicating a shift towards the view
taken by Goldberg, Harlan, and Stewart that collective bargaining agreements
concerning mandatory subjects of bargaining were exempt from Sherman Act
scrutiny.64
Thus, it is relatively well settled that the existence of labor unions as well
as many of the activities in which they engage are statutorily exempt from the
Sherman Act under section 20 of the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. That statutory immunity, however, extends only to a point short of
59. Id. at 622.
60. Id. at 622-23 (citation omitted).
61. Id. at 625.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 625-26.
64. See text accompanying notes 53-55 supra.
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union-employer combinations that restrain the product market.65 Since union-
employer combinations are involved in the process of collective bargaining,
which is looked on with favor by the federal labor laws, the Court has granted
a nonstatutory exemption to certain collective bargaining agreements that
restrain the product market if they at least concern mandatory subjects of
bargaining and are not established for the purpose of excluding competitors. 66
All the cases thus far considered differ from the issues presented by the
professional sports cases in that the former dealt with union-management
agreements that worked to the detriment of management's competitors while
the latter have dealt with agreements that work to the detriment of the labor
force-that is, the players. Before considering whether equalization provi-
sions employed in professional sports are entitled to a nonstatutory exemp-
tion from the Sherman Act because they are the product of bona fide arm's-
length collective bargaining over a mandatory subject, it will be helpful to
look at equalization provisions, the purposes such provisions serve, and the
manner in which it is argued they violate section I of the Sherman Act.
It. EQUALIZATION PROVISIONS: THE PURPOSE AND THE PROBLEMS
Team owners say that equalization provisions, such as By-Law 9A con-
sidered in McCourt, 7 are necessary to maintain the economic solvency of all
the teams in the league and to maintain the number of employment opportuni-
ties for the players. If it were not for such compensation agreements, the
owners argue, the rich teams would get richer, the poor teams would get
poorer, and the fan interest would decline; if the fan interest declines to a
point that it is no longer feasible to maintain a team, the team folds; and if a
team folds, the league is weakened and, since there are fewer teams, there are
fewer employment opportunities for professional athletes. Of course, if the
primary objective of compensation agreements such as By-Law 9A is to main-
tain a competitive balance in the League, the competitive history of the NHL
seems to indicate that the equalization provisions employed have been less
than successful. Some form of restriction on movement of hockey players has
been incorporated into the players' contracts since 1958. 6s From that time
until McCourt filed suit in 1978, the Montreal Canadiens have won the Stanley
Cup, the "World Series of Hockey," twelve times. 69 On the other hand, the
lack of competitive balance may be due to differences in the respective wealth
of NHL club owners, the development of good minor league talent from
which the NHL parent can draw, and coaching abilities. One might argue,
with at least some degree of force, that without an equalization provision such
as By-Law 9A there would be even less competitive balance in the NHL.
65. See text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.
66. See text accompanying notes 46-57 supra.
67. 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979).
68. See Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 480
(E.D. Pa. 1972).
69. 1979 WORLD ALMANAC 837.
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The players argue that equalization provisions restrain competition for
their services, significantly deter clubs from signing free agents, deny players
the right to sell their services in a free and open market, and result in lower
salaries than would be obtained if free competitive bidding were allowed. The
players believe that the restraints caused by these provisions are more restric-
tive than are necessary to achieve their asserted goals, and as such violate
section 1 of the Sherman Act under the rule of reason standard.70
Equalization provisions affect free agents because member teams may be
less likely to sign them for fear that the team may have to give up valuable
players or draft choices. 7 ' The free agent, therefore, becomes less marketable
and, even if a team is willing to take a chance and sign him, that team will have
to consider the cost of the equalization payment when it negotiates salary and
benefits. Players such as McCourt are affected for obvious reasons. They are
forced to move themselves and their families, which creates personal hard-
ships. Professional hardships may result if the player is not able to draw the
kind of salary from his new team that he drew from his old team.
As will be seen by the antitrust treatment of equalization provisions in
other sports cases, it is highly probable that a court will find an equalization
provision such as By-Law 9A not to be justified by any legitimate purpose and
thus a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act under the rule of reason
standard.72 It then becomes paramount to the survival of an equalization
provision that it be incorporated into a collective bargaining agreement in a
way that would entitle it to a nonstatutory labor exemption from the Sherman
Act.
III. ANTITRUST CHALLENGES IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
A. Baseball
Baseball, America's grand old game, is enjoyed by millions of people
every year. From the questioning apprehension of spring training to the
nervous tension of the Fall Classic, baseball, according to some, possesses
that certain something that other professional sports seem to lack. While that
is a matter of personal predilictions and conceivable dispute, baseball does
possess a certain legal advantage that other professional sports do not enjoy-
a judicially sanctioned exemption from the antitrust laws.
70. See note 92 infra.
71. NHL By-Law 9A 8 (c) provides in part:
The Club's proposals and the arbitrator's determination of equalization must be limited to:
(i) the assignment of a contract or contracts for the services of a player or players binding upon
such player or players for at least the next season; and/or
(ii) choices in any intra-league and/or amateur drafts to be held at any time subsequent to such
proposal and/or unsigned draft choices or negotiation nominees; andlor
(iii) cash.
72. See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1976).
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In Federal Baseball Club v. National League,73 the Supreme Court
declared that baseball was not interstate commerce and was not subject to the
antitrust laws. Fifty years passed and the Court's decision deflected several
antitrust challenges to baseball and its reserve system. Attempts at obtaining
a congressional overruling of Federal Baseball also proved fruitless. In 1952,
the Report of the Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly Power of the
House Committee on the Judiciary concluded: "[T]he overwhelming pre-
ponderance of the evidence established baseball's need for a reserve clause.
Baseball's history shows that chaotic conditions prevailed when there was no
reserve clause. Experience points to no feasible substitute to protect the
integrity of the game or to guarantee a comparatively even competitive
struggle." 74 In 1953, the Court affirmed its Federal Baseball decision in
Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc . 7' The Court listed four reasons for main-
taining the viability of baseball's antitrust exemption. First, the Court noted
the congressional awareness of the Federal Baseball decision and its lack of
any effort to legislatively overrule it. Second, baseball had been left to
develop for thirty years on the understanding that it would not be subject to
the antitrust laws. Third, the Court did not want to overrule Federal Baseball
for fear of its retroactive effect. The fourth and final reason for maintaining
the exemption was the Court's feeling that if the reserve clause contained any
antitrust evils they should be dealt with via legislation. 76
In 1972, the Court again had the opportunity to strike down baseball's
reserve system, which contained equalization provisions. In Flood v. Kuhn,'n
the Court again held baseball's reserve system not subject to the antitrust
laws, stating that "Congress, by its positive inaction, has allowed those deci-
sions [Federal Baseball and Toolson] to stand for so long and, far beyond
mere inference and implication, has clearly evinced a desire not to disapprove
of them legislatively." 7 8 The Court did, however, limit the exemption to base-
ball and recognized that "[o]ther professional sports operating interstate-
football, boxing, basketball, and, presumably, hockey and golf-are not so
exempt." 79 Because the Court reached the decision on other grounds, it found
it unnecessary to consider the argument of the Commissioner of baseball that
the reserve system was a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, incorpo-
rated into the collective bargaining agreement signed by the players union,
and thus entitled to a nonstatutory exemption from the Sherman Act.80 The
Commissioner's argument was based on Justice Goldberg's reasoning in
Jewel Tea.81
73. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
74. H.R. REP. NO. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 229 (1952).
75. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
76. Id. at 357.
77. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
78. Id. at 283-84.
79. Id. at 282-83.
80. Id. at 285.
81. See text accompanying notes 53-55 supra. Mr. Goldberg happened to be counsel for Mr. Flood.
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Justice Marshall, dissenting in Flood,82 spoke to the possible applicability
of the nonstatutory exemption from the Sherman Act to the reserve system
since the reserve system was made a part of a collective bargaining agreement
signed by the players union, the Major League Players Association.8
Marshall pointed to the fact that none of the cases in the area were precisely
on point. These cases all had concerned union-management agreements that
worked to the detriment of management's competitors. In the professional
sports area, however, the reserve system worked to the detriment of labor.
Justice Marshall also pointed to Flood's claim that the reserve system was
thrust upon the players by the owners and that the recently formed players
union had not had time to modify or eradicate it.84 He felt that if Flood's claim
were true, exemption from the antitrust laws would be questionable.85
B. Football
While baseball's reserve system has enjoyed a unique exemption from
the antitrust laws, football has not been so fortunate. 86 Football's reserve
clause, named the "Rozelle Rule," after Football Commissioner Pete
Rozelle, was virtually identical to the NHL's By-Law 9A.87 Like By-Law 9A,
the Rozelle Rule required a team that signed a free agent to compensate the
free agent's former team. Several football players challenged the validity of
the rule under the antitrust laws in Mackey v. National Football League. 
8
Since the McCourt decision was premised on the foundations laid in Mackey,
a somewhat extensive review of that case is in order.
The players in Mackey alleged that the enforcement by the National
Football League of the Rozelle Rule constituted a concerted refusal to dealo
and a group boycott,90 and thus a per se violation of the Sherman Act.91 The
district court agreed, and in the alternative, found that the Rozelle Rule
constituted a violation of the antitrust laws under the rule of reason
82. 407 U.S. 258, 288 (1972).
83. See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra.
84. 407 U.S. 258, 294 (1972).
85. Id. at 295.
86. See Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
87. See note 2 supra. The only difference between By-Law 9A and the Rozelle Rule was that the Rozelle
Rule called for the Commissioner of Football to determine the reasonable compensation for the acquisition of a
free agent should the teams be unable to agree. By-Law 9A provided for an independent arbiter to make the
decision in case of such an impasse.
88. 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975), aff'd, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801
(1977).
89. A concerted refusal to deal has been defined as "'an agreement by two or more persons not to do
business with other individuals, or to do business with them only on specific terms." See Note, Concerted
Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1531 (1958).
90. A group boycott usually means a refusal to deal or an inducement of others not to deal or have business
relations with tradesmen. See Kalinowski, The Per Se Doctrine-An Emerging Philosophy ofAntitrust Law, II
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 569, 580 n.49 (1964).
91. 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1007 (D. Minn. 1975). Certain types of restraints such as price fixing, group
boycotts, and concerted refusals to deal are so consistently unreasonable that they may be deemed illegal per se
without inquiring into their purported justifications. See generally Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S.
457 (1941); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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standard. 92 The court rejected the National Football League's argument that
the Rozelle Rule was exempt from Sherman Act sanctions, stating that the
labor exemption extended only to labor union activities and not the activities
of employers. The court felt that even if the exemption could be extended to
cover the activities of employers as a general rule, it could not be so extended
under the facts of the case.93
On appeal, the players argued, as the district court had found, that only
employee groups were entitled to the labor exemption and that the defen-
dants, an employer group, could not assert the exemption. The Eighth Circuit
disagreed, stating as follows:
Since the basis of the nonstatutory exemption is the national policy favoring
collective bargaining, and since the exemption extends to agreements, the benefits
of the exemption logically extend to both parties to the agreement. Accordingly,
under appropriate circumstances, we find that a non-labor group may avail itself of
the labor exemption.
94
The court then embarked on the task of trying to determine the governing
principles established by the Supreme Court in the labor exemption area.
According to the court, Connell,95 Jewel Tea,9' and Pennington97 stood for the
proposition that the availability of the nonstatutory exemption for a particular
agreement turned upon whether the relevant federal labor policy deserved
pre-eminence over federal antitrust policy under the circumstances of the
particular case. 98 The court felt that labor policy would be pre-eminent if three
tests were satisfied. First, the restraint on trade created by the collective
bargaining agreement must primarily affect only the parties to the collective
bargaining relationship. 99 Imposition of terms of a collective bargaining agree-
ment on other bargaining units was the concern of Pennington.'oo Second, the
agreement could be exempted only if it concerned a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining.' 0 ' To hold agreements concerning mandatory subjects
of collective bargaining subject to the antitrust laws would run contrary to the
policies of the federal labor laws, a concern of the Court in Jewel Tea.'02
Third, the agreement sought to be exempted has to be the product of bona fide
arm's length bargaining, 03 the final requirement deduced from Jewel Tea.
92. In making a determination under the rule of reason standard, the court will determine whether the
restraint imposed is justified by legitimate business purposes and is no more restrictive than necessary to
achieve those legitimate purposes. See Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, 2 ANTITRUST LAW 314b at 47 (1978).
93. 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1008 (D. Minn. 1975).
94. 543 F.2d 606, 612 (8th Cir. 1976).
95. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
96. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
97. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
98. 543 F.2d 606, 613 (8th Cir. 1976).
99. Id. at 614.
100. See text accompanying notes 38-44 supra.
101. 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976).
102. See text accompanying notes 47-55 supra.
103. 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976).
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Since it was "clear" that the restraint of trade caused by the Rozelle Rule
affected only the parties to the agreement, the court sought to determine
whether the Rozelle Rule was a mandatory subject of collective bargaining in
that it was related to wages, hours, and working conditions as provided in
section 8 (d) of the National Labor Relations Act. '4 The court found that
while the Rozelle Rule did not deal with wages, hours, and working conditions
on its face, it did restrict a player's ability to move from one team to another
and it depressed players' salaries. Since it had an effect on salaries, the court
felt the Rozelle Rule constituted a mandatory subject within the meaning of
the Act. 05 The court ultimately held the nonstatutory exemption inapplicable
because the Rozelle Rule was thrust upon the infant players union and thus
was never a subject of bona fide arm's length collective bargaining prior to the
execution of the collective bargaining agreements.'06 The court went on to
find that the Rozelle Rule was an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act because it was "significantly more restrictive
than necessary to serve any legitimate purposes it might have [had]," 107 since
it operated as a perpetual restriction on player movement.
C. Hockey
Antitrust challenges to the NHL's reserve system began after the forma-
tion of the World Hockey Association (WHA).'03 The WHA challenged the
NHL's reserve system in the case of Philadelphia World Hockey Club v.
Philadelphia Hockey Club.10 The reserve clause embodied in the players'
contracts not only prevented them from signing contracts with member NHL
clubs of their own choosing but also prevented them from signing to play in
the WHA. The court in Philadelphia Hockey enjoined the NHL from enforc-
ing the reserve clause because there was a substantial likelihood that it vio-
lated section 2 of the Sherman Act."0 The court held that the nonstatutory
labor exemption was inapplicable, stating that "restraining, anti-competitive
acts will not be immunized from the Sherman Act." ' The court felt that the
labor exemption could be defensively utilized by the union and an employer
as a shield against Sherman Act proceedings when there was bona fide collec-
tive bargaining. It could not, however, be seized upon by either party and be
destructively wielded'as a sword by engaging in monopolistic or other anti-
104. See note 134 infra.
105. 543 F.2d 606, 615 (8th Cir. 1976).
106. Id. at 616.
107. Id. at 622.
108. The World Hockey Association ceased to exist in 1979. Four of its teams are now members of the
National Hockey League.
109. 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
110. Id. at 518.
Ill. Id. at 499. See also Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd
556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977), where the court refused to grant a labor exemption to the N.B.A. The court based its
decision on language from Pennington that said "there are limits to what a union or an employer may offer or
extract in the name of wages, and because they must bargain does not mean the agreement reached may
disregard other laws ...." 381 U.S. 657, 665 (1965).
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competitive conduct." 2 The court reasoned that the problem was similar to
the one posed in Allen Bradley 3 and that the NHL could not be the benefici-
ary of a labor exemption to excuse it from its otherwise monopolistic prac-
tices. According to the court, the NHL was primarily responsible for devising
and perpetuating a monopoly in the "product" market of all hockey players
via the reserve system.4
Boston Professional Hockey Association, Inc. v. Cheevers"5 was a suit
by an NHL team, the Boston Bruins, to prevent two of its star players from
playing for a WHA team. The court refused to issue an injunction restraining
the players from signing with the WHA club, stating in part:
In light of the fact that this complex [reserve] system dominates and controls a
hockey player's career ... it would be unrealistic to rule that the Bruins sustained
their burden of showing that there is a probability that this tangled web of legal
instruments will not be found to restrain trade in professional hockey.
16
Nassau Sports v. Hampson,"7 like Cheevers, was a suit by an NHL club
to prohibit a player from signing with a WHA club. The court refused to grant
the NHL team's request for an injunction, stating that the restrictive clause in
the player's contract, which was based on a similar provision to By-Law 9A,
might possibly be found a violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act."
8
These district court cases concerned either a WHA club suing an NHL
club to have the NHL's reserve system struck down as a violation of the
antitrust laws, or an NHL club suing a player to have the reserve clause in his
contract enforced. McCourt, on the other hand, was a player's attempt to
have the reserve clause in his contract struck down as a violation of the
Sherman Act, notwithstanding the fact that the reserve system was made a
part of a collective bargaining agreement signed by the players union, the
National Hockey League Players Association.
The McCourt case provided another opportunity for a court to consider
the applicability of the nonstatutory exemption to a restrictive equalization
provision similar to the "Rozelle Rule" considered in Mackey.
IV. THE MCCOURT DILEMMA
A. The Facts
Dale McCourt signed a National Hockey League standard player's con-
tract with the Detroit Hockey Club, Inc. to play professional hockey with the
Detroit Red Wings for a period of three years beginning with the 1977-78
112. 351 F. Supp. 462, 499-500 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
113. See text accompanying notes 31-33 supra.
114. 351 F. Supp. 462, 500 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
115. 348 F. Supp. 261 (D. Mass.), remanded on other grounds, 472 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1972).
116. Id. at 267.
117. 355 F. Supp. 733 (D. Minn. 1972).
118. Id. at 736.
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season. In 1978 the Red Wings acquired the services of Rogatien Vachon, a
free agent who had played out his option with the Los Angeles Kings. Pur-
suant to National Hockey League By-Law 9A, Detroit assigned McCourt's
contract to Los Angeles as an equalization payment for the acquisition of
Vachon. Rather than report to the Kings, McCourt brought suit against the
Los Angeles Kings and the NHL in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan." 9
McCourt claimed that the National Hockey League reserve system and
the assignment of his contract to the Los Angeles Kings violated section 1 of
the Sherman Act, 20 thus entitling him to injunctive relief pursuant to sections
4 and 10 of the Clayton Act. 2 ' Defendants claimed that even if By-Law 9A
violated section 1 of the Sherman Act, it was incorporated into the collective
bargaining agreement with the National Hockey League Players Association
and was thus entitled to the nonstatutory exemption from the antitrust laws.122
The district court entered a preliminary injunction restraining the defen-
dants from sending McCourt to California. In an opinion accompanying the
issuance of the preliminary injunction, the district judge held that By-Law 9A
unreasonably restrained trade in commerce in violation of section I of the
Sherman Act. 23 Having thus ruled, the district judge went on to hold that
defendants were not entitled to the benefit of the nonstatutory labor exemp-
tion from antitrust sanctions because
[t]he preponderance of evidence.., establishes that bylaw 9A was not the
product of bona fide arm's length bargaining over any of its anticompetitive provi-
sions .... The bylaw was included in the collective bargaining agreement to give
the impression that it was a bargained-for provision. When labor and non-labor
groups combine to insert into a collective bargaining agreement a non-negotiated
provision, courts will not afford either party the non-statutory labor exemption.124
The district court in McCourt recognized that the National Hockey
League Players Association was opposed to incorporation of By-Law 9A into
the collective bargaining agreement. The Players Association agreed to
include By-Law 9A in the collective bargaining agreement only after the NHL
conceded that the Players Association could terminate the entire agreement if
the NHL merged with the WHA. '25 Mr. Ziegler, President of the NHL, indi-
cated that "although the NHL was willing to negotiate on equalization at any
time, the players had to adhere to the bylaw because the Standard Player's
Contract required them to adhere to all bylaws adopted by the NHL."' 2 6 In
light of the above facts, the district court rejected the NHL's argument that
119. McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 904 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
120. See note 9 supra.
121. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 & 26 (1976).
122. 460 F. Supp. 904, 910 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
123. Id. at 907.
124. Id. at 910-11.
125. Id. at 911.
126. Id. See note 4 supra.
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the Players Association had received a substantial quid pro quo for adopting
By-Law 9A and that this was evidence that the By-Law was a product of bona
fide arm's length collective bargaining.'2 7
The appellate court reached a different conclusion. It held that the prin-
ciples set forth in Mackey were properly applicable, but that the district court
had incorrectly applied them. 128
Following the Mackey standards, the Sixth Circuit found, first, that the
restraint on trade caused by By-Law 9A primarily affected only the parties to
the collective bargaining relationship, the hockey players. The WHA, which
would also have been affected, had accepted the system in a settlement
following Philadelphia Hockey.' 29 Second, the court held By-Law 9A to be a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining within the meaning of section 8 (d)
of the National Labor Relations Act. 3° The court considered it a term and
condition of employment of the hockey players because of the restraints it put
on a player's ability to move from one team to another. Third, the court,
disagreeing with the lower court, found that By-Law 9A was the product of
bona fide arm's length bargaining. 3 The court recognized that while the NHL
owners did not budge on their insistence of incorporating By-Law 9A into the
collective bargaining agreement, they yielded on other issues such as in-
creased bonus money for players whose teams finished high in their divisions,
and other monetary benefits. The court disagreed with the trial court's finding
that those benefits were a result of a threat of an antitrust suit to void By-Law
9A. The appellate court also relied on the fact that the NHL accepted a
provision in the collective bargaining agreement, providing that the entire
agreement would be voided should the NHL and WHA merge.
132
The fact that the NHL introduced and insisted that By-Law 9A be incor-
porated into the collective bargaining agreement was, according to the court,
inconsequential since nothing in the labor law compelled either party negotiat-
ing over mandatory subjects of collective bargaining to yield on its initial
bargaining position. 3 3 Section 8 (d) of the National Labor Relations Act
expressly provides that the obligation to bargain over wages, hours, and
working conditions does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or
concede any part of their position.'34
127. 460 F. Supp. 904, 911 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
128. 600 F.2d 1193, 1203 (6th Cir. 1979).
129. Id. at 1198 n.8.
130. Id. at 1198. See note 41 supra.
131. 600 F.2d 1193, 1203 (6th Cir. 1979).
132. Id. at 1202-03.
133. Id. at 1200.
134. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (d) (1980), in relevant part provides as follows:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of
the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.., but such
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a conces-
sion ....
For cases consistent with this view, see NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952); NLRB v.
United Clay Mines Corp., 219 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1955). But see NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d
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B. The Concerns of the Dissent
The McCourt dissent relied heavily on the Allen Bradley principle of not
recognizing a labor exemption for a particular collective bargaining agreement
if the union participated with a combination of businessmen who had com-
plete power to eliminate all competition among themselves and to prevent all
competition from others. 135 The dissent seems to have failed to recognize the
important fact that in Allen Bradley, the challenger to the union activity was
not a union member, but rather an outsider who wished to compete in a
market that was closed to it by the union agreements with the insiders .
36
Allen Bradley is at least entitled to an interpretation that union agreements
that impose restraints on the product market by affecting competitors outside
of the collective bargaining agreement would not be entitled to a labor exemp-
tion from the Sherman Act. This line of reasoning seems to have been main-
tained by the Court in Pennington. 137 In McCourt, the outside competitor
analogous to Allen Bradley was the WHA, which had accepted the NHL's
reserve system in a settlement following the Philadelphia Hockey case.
3
Indeed, some commentators have argued that Allen Bradley and
Pennington stand for the proposition that employers must conspire to use the
union to hurt their competitors before an agreement reached through the
collective bargaining process would be subject to antitrust scrutiny. 139 These
writers contend that the line the Court has sought to draw is one between the
product market and the labor market. '40 They believe that reserve clauses are
labor market issues and thus are not subject to the antitrust laws. Prior to the
McCourt decision, the courts had refused to go that far, perhaps because they
have recognized that Congress has put limits on what can be agreed upon in
the collective bargaining process, 14' and by relying on the phrase in Penning-
ton that "there are limits to what a union or employer may offer or extract in
the name of wages, and because they must bargain does not mean that the
agreement may disregard other laws," 142 an otherwise valid collective bar-
gaining agreement cannot be used to circumvent the antitrust Laws.
676, 686 (9th Cir. 1943), in which it was stated that § 8 (d) meant "an obligation to participate actively in good
faith bargaining in the deliberations with a present intention to find a basis for an agreement." Not only must the
employer "have an open mind and ' sincere desire to reach an agreement" but "a sincere effort must be made to
reach a common ground." Furthermore, according to the National Labor Relations Board and the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 418 F2d 736, 757 (2d Cir. 1970), a "take it or leave it"
attitude on the part of the employer is not good faith bargaining under § 8 (d).
135. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
136. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
137. See text accompanying notes 42-45 supra.
138. See text accompanying note 129 supra.
139. Jacobs & Winter, Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in
Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1, 26 (1971).
140. Id. at 26.
141. For example, the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1976), establishes minimum wages below
which no collective bargaining agreement may go. See also Federal Occupational Health and Safety Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1976), which specifies working conditions that cannot be avoided by any collective bargaining
agreement.
142. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665 (1965). For an excellent discussion of the
arguments against granting a labor exemption to reserve clauses embodied in collective bargaining agreements,
see L. SOBEL, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS & THE LAW 323-29 (1977).
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Nevertheless, Justice White's opinion in Jewel indicated that union-
employer agreements placing restraints on the product market would be
exempt from the Sherman Act if they were "intimately related to wages,
hours and working conditions [and were] in pursuit of [the union's] own labor
policies, and not at the behest of or in combination with non-labor
groups .... ,"'4 One might interpret Justice White's opinion in Jewel to mean
that only agreements sought by the union would be entitled to a labor exemp-
tion, and the dissent in McCourt seems to have adopted this reasoning,' 44 yet
it was rejected in Mackey.' 45 It is the agreement that is subject to the ex-
emption, and not the party who introduces it. To hold otherwise would
undermine the collective bargaining process by declaring that the union repre-
sentative has no authority to make agreements on behalf of the players-at
least insofar as management-initiated provisions that arguably violate anti-
trust are concerned. Yet, allowing an individual player to raise antitrust
exemptions to sucr-agreements would be to ignore the first principle of the
National Labor Relations Act that employees in a bargaining unit lose their
right to bargain individually when a majority votes to be represented by a
union. "
This is not to say that McCourt did not have standing to sue. '47 What it
does say is that McCourt could not succeed in an antitrust challenge to the
reserve clause if it was incorporated into a collective bargaining agreement
arrived at through bona fide arm's length bargaining, affected only the parties
to the agreement, and concerned a mandatory subject of collective bargain-
ing. 148
The McCourt dissent read the majority to say that the Eighth Circuit had
effectively overruled its Mackey decision' 49 in Reynolds v. National Football
143. 381 U.S. 676, 681 (1965). See text accompanying note 48 supra.
144. 600 F.2d 1193, 1212 (6th Cir. 1979). See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738, 744 (D.D.C.
1976). aff'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The district court in Smith felt that if a bargain was
concluded as a result of"bona fide arm's length bargaining in pursuit [of the union's own] policies and not at the
behest of non-labor groups it is exempt from the antitrust laws."
145. See text accompanying note 94 supra.
146. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (a) (1976), provides in part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the maj6rity of the
employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representative of all the
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours
of employment, or other conditions of employment .... "
See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50 (1975). See also NLRB
v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1975), where it was said:
National labor policy has been built on the premise that by pooling their economic strength and acting
through a labor organization freely chosen by the majority, the employees of an appropriate unit have
the most effective means of bargaining for improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions. The
policy therefore extinguishes the individual employee's power to order his own relations with his
employer and creates a power vested in the chosen representative to act in the interests of all em-
ployees. "Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining representative with powers comparable to
those possessed by a legislative body both to create and restrict the rights of those whom it repre-
sents... .- (Citations omitted.)
147. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
148. See text accompanying notes 99-107 supra.
149. 600 F.2d 1193, 1214 (6th Cir. 1979).
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League. 150 Following the Mackey decision, the NFL and the players reached
a settlement that produced a modified Rozelle Rule. The settlement was chal-
lenged in Reynolds. The Eighth Circuit affirmed its Mackey decision and
upheld the settlement because, unlike Mackey, the settlement had been the
subject of bona fide arm's length collective bargaining. It was clear that the
court in Reynolds did not overrule its Mackey decision, and it is probable that
the McCourt majority interpreted Reynolds that way. Mackey merely held
that the nonstatutory exemption was not available because the facts of the
case indicated that the Rozelle Rule had never been the subject of bona fide
arm's length collective bargaining. The court in Mackey had agreed with the
lower court's finding that because the National Football League Players
Association was relatively new and financially weak when the Rozelle Rule
was imposed on it, there was no bona fide arm's length bargaining over the
Rozelle Rule prior to the signings of the 1968 and 1970 collective bargaining
agreements. 15' That was no longer true when the Reynolds case came before
the court, and thus the modified Rozelle Rule was entitled to the nonstatutory
labor exemption from the Sherman Act.
Indeed, Mackey might be interpreted to mean that unilateral imposition
of restrictive agreements on a weak union is evidence that the agreement was
not the subject of collective bagaining and thus not entitled to be the non-
statutory exemption from the Sherman Act. Even assuming that the National
Hockey League Players Association was weak at the time By-Law 9A was
agreed to, the McCourt majority disregarded that interpretation of Mackey
and instead based its decision on section 8 (d) of the National Labor Relations
Act, which does not require either party to change from its original position in
the process of collective bargaining.
152
The dissent felt that if any exemption for reserve clauses were to be
found in the area of professional sports, it should be created by Congress and
not by judicial interpretation of congressional labor law policies.' 53 Congress
has considered several proposals to exempt professional sports from antitrust
sanctions, 154 yet none have matured into law. The only statutory action that
Congress has taken expresses congressional unwillingness to act by stating:
(N)othing contained in this chapter shall be deemed to change, determine, or
otherwise affect, the applicability or non-applicability of the antitrust laws to any
act, contract, agreement, rule, course of conduct or other activity by, between, or
among persons engaging in, conducting, or participating in the organized profes-
sional team sports of football, baseball or hockey. 1
55
150. 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978).
151. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 616 (8th Cir. 1976).
152. See text accompanying note 133 supra.
153. 600 F.2d 1193, 1209 (6th Cir. 1979).
154. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 281 n.40 (1972).
155. 15 U.S.C. § 1294 (1976).
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Perhaps by finding that the equalization provision of By-Law 9A was
entitled to a nonstatutory labor exemption from the Sherman Act, the
McCourt majority put its seal of approval on a provision that was more
restrictive than was necessary to achieve its stated goals and thus violative of
the Sherman Act but for the labor exemption. The result of Mackey, which
held that the labor exemption did not apply, was the redrawing of a less
restrictive Rozelle Rule. Perhaps the same outcome will be reached in the
NHL: the merger between the WHA and the NHL in 1979 nullified the collec-
tive bargaining agreement at issue in McCourt. 156 But if a court were to deny a
labor exemption to collective bargaining agreements with the hope that less
restrictive agreements could be arrived at, the industrial peace that collective
bargaining is supposed to achieve would be put in serious danger. "Denying a
demand to a party may thus increase the chances of a strike because it lessens
the area of possible compromise without affecting the underlying strength of
the parties." 157
The players in professional sports have chosen to unionize with the idea
that they can obtain more benefits from team owners by joining forces and
bargaining collectively. With that in mind, it is easy to fall into the dissent's
line of reasoning. The possibility exists, of course, that had there been no
players union, McCourt might successfully have challenged By-Law 9A since
there would have been no opportunity for owners to claim a labor exemption
from the antitrust laws.
The dissent believed the issue to be not whether there was good faith
arm's length bargaining over By-Law 9A, but rather
whether an association of employers may in the organized sports industry (here it
is hockey) gain exemption from the antitrust laws for an agreement among them-
selves to restrict otherwise free competition in employment of hockey players by
imposing their employer-devised agreement upon a union representing that class
of employees through use of economic inducement or compulsion.15
The dissent answered the question in the negative and, while there are
strong arguments to support that position, the majority holding in McCourt
was probably correct. The Supreme Court in Jewel Tea 159 recognized con-
gressional favoritism for collective bargaining agreements concerning wages,
hours, and working conditions. McCourt did not concern any union-employer
conspiracy to exclude competitors as was the case in Allen Bradley'6 and
Pennington. 16' Even if it had, it would seem that the proper party to assert
that claim would be the WHA since its members were the ones who were
being excluded. Nevertheless, the courts have allowed players to challenge
156. See text accompanying note 125 supra.
157. Jacobs & Winter, Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in
Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1, 13 (1971).
158. 600 F.2d 1193, 1206 (6th Cir. 1979).
159. See text accompanying notes 47-50 supra.
.160. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
161. See text accompanying notes 38-45 supra.
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equalization provisions incorporated into collective bargaining agreements
under the antitrust laws, and until McCourt the players have been nothing but
successful. McCourt quite properly failed in his challenge because the equali-
zation provision he challenged affected only the parties to the agreement, and
the others who were affected acquiesced. It concerned a mandatory subject of
bargaining-a condition of employment about which the parties must bargain
under section 8 (d) of the National Labor Relations Act' 62-and was the
product of bona fide arm's length bargaining. When an agreement meets these
standards, the policies embodied in the antitrust laws are outweighed by the
federal policy favoring collective bargaining embodied in the labor laws.
V. CONCLUSION
The courts have struggled with the delicate task of balancing the seem-
ingly contradictory federal labor and antitrust policies for the better part of
this century. The unionization of professional athletes has dragged profes-
sional sports into this uncertain area of the law. It seems as though the
McCourt decision has taken a step in the right direction by giving due recogni-
tion to federal labor policy favoring agreements reached through the collec-
tive bargaining process. Perhaps, with the increasing strength of player
unions, the indices of slavery surrounding professional sports will be
abrogated via the collective bargaining process. Should that not prove to be
the case, it would seem that the time is ripe for the Supreme Court to decide
this difficult issue.
Mark S. Miller
162. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
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